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Title: It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder! ‘Negotiated management’ and 
Mismanagement in the Policing of G8 Protests. 
 
Abstract: Recent analyses of protest policing in Western democracies argue 
that there has been a marked shift away from oppressive or coercive 
approaches to an emphasis on consensus based negotiation. King and 
Waddington (2005) amongst others, however, suggest that the policing of 
international summits may be an exception to this rule. This paper examines 
protest policing in relation to the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. We 
argue that ‘negotiated management’ cannot be imported wholesale as a 
policing strategy. Rather it is mediated by local history, forms of police 
knowledge and modes of engagement. Drawing on interviews and participant 
observation we show that ‘negotiated management’ works best when both 
sides are committed to negotiation and that police stereotyping or protestor 
intransigence can lead to the escalation of any given event. In closing we note 
the new challenges posed by forms of ‘global’ protest and consider the 
implications for future policing of protest. 
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It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder! ‘Negotiated management’ and 
Mismanagement in the Policing of G8 Protests.1 
 
 
You know for me – I had mixed emotions about Gleneagles. On the one hand I 
think everybody that got there deserves a medal because honest to God … 
there was roadblocks, there was a blatant attempt to stop twenty coaches 
leaving Edinburgh, and when they did – the journey from Edinburgh to 
Gleneagles is forty-one miles, yet […] 214 miles we had to travel to get there 
because they sent us across country and back and then again. And we made it 
and I think that everyone who got there deserves an orienteering medal.  
(Fox, Interview).2 
 
Introduction 
When the Group of Eight (G8) leaders came to Britain in 2005 a rural location in 
Scotland was selected as the venue. As in Canada in 2002, where the retreat to the 
Rocky Mountains split protests, the choice of Gleneagles presented protesters with 
severe obstacles of access. In a replay of 2002, the major protests abandoned the tactic 
of besiegement to demonstrate in the Scottish capital of Edinburgh, leaving a smaller 
group of protestors to take their message directly to the summit. The policing of these 
protests is the focus of this paper.  
 
Sheptycki (2005: 346) argues that the organisation and policing of summit 
protests provide insights into the ‘character of the global system’. From this 
perspective, the strategic retreat by global leaders to inaccessible loci highlights a lack 
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of democratic accountability. This is reinforced by accounts that view transnational 
protest policing as bucking a trend towards more tolerant and negotiated styles of 
policing (Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006; Waddington & King 2005). Problems 
with a global systems approach are discernible in these accounts and evident in our 
research, highlighting the contingent processes and interactions which shape policing 
on the ground. Indeed pre-summit, the Scottish police rehearsed arguments in which 
competing claims of leaders, local residents and protestors were carefully calibrated 
and weighted in the ‘negotiated management’ style. In the event, however, police 
responses to protest encompassed an array of tactics ranging from coercion to 
facilitation.  
 
Whilst the largest G8-related demonstrations passed off peacefully in 
Edinburgh (see Gorringe and Rosie 2006) – some distance from where world leaders 
were meeting – this paper focuses on the smaller protests that occurred on the opening 
day of the actual summit. Our aim is to disentangle the dynamic interplay between 
police and protestors during these protests. We draw on ethnographic research to 
determine the extent to which ‘the policies and procedures described [by police] were 
actually practised’ (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998: 50). Our analysis 
suggests that disruption and violence were minimized where policing most closely 
resembled the negotiated management approach, but whether this succeeded or not 
depended on local specificities. We begin by considering recent accounts of protest 
policing before turning to our research at the 2005 summit. In conclusion we bring 
data and theory together and consider the implications of our findings.  
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Policing protest 
Several studies document a Western trend towards more democratic and consensual 
policing of protest. Prominent within so-called ‘soft-hat’ approaches to protest 
policing is ‘negotiated management’ (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998; 
Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Gillham and Marx 2000; Waddington and King 2005). 
This relegates repressive ‘heavy-handed’ police tactics, emphasizing cooperation and 
communication between police and protestors. The intent is to ‘de-escalate’ sensitive 
situations and reduce the likelihood of violence. This entails safeguarding (even 
facilitating) rights to protest, and negotiated solutions include the careful stage-
managing of events and the toleration of disruption to public life. 
 
In effect, negotiated management entails altering the ‘rules of the game’ to 
allow greater police discretion in facilitating protests and in interacting with protest 
groups. This trend away from ‘king’s police’ approaches towards an emphasis on 
community policing maps onto a coherent police philosophy relating to legitimacy 
and democracy. This reflects growing awareness that repressive policing is often 
counter-productive and may reinforce protest or provoke further demonstrations 
(Della Porta and Fillieule 2004; Vitale 2005; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003). Whilst 
McPhail et al. (1998) chart the US emergence of negotiated management from the 
1960s, this analysis has been a touchstone of British policing since the Scarman 
Report into the 1981 Brixton riots (themselves in part a reaction to oppressive 
policing). Negotiated management, thus, draws on different sources and is neither 
universal nor uniform, resulting in variation within police responses.  
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Della Porta and Fillieule (2004) argue that a key intervening variable here is 
‘police knowledge’. Police forces, they note, generate stereotypes and short-hand 
texts in coming to ‘know’ a protest constituency, anticipating how they will behave, 
and what kind of policing will be appropriate. Based on research in France, Fillieule 
and Jobbard (1998) suggest three interrelated influences. Foremost are the perceptions 
of the police, their understanding of the protest group and their likely tactics, and their 
sense of whether the protest objectives are legitimate. The second variable is the 
degree to which police come under political pressure to take a particular course of 
action. The third is the response the police have ‘on the day’ to the tactics actually 
utilized by protestors. 
 
Such studies highlight contingent aspects of policing, but also caution against 
viewing incidents of disorder as isolated events. Frustrated at frequent references to 
riots being ‘sparked off’ D. Waddington et al. (Waddington, Jones and Critcher 1989: 
2) developed their ‘flashpoints model’ of public disorder. This ‘combines reference to 
antecedent conditions (the ‘tinder’) with a highlighting of interpersonal interaction 
(the ‘spark’)’. They reinforce the need to examine the wider contexts within which 
disorder occurs and is framed. The model proposes six inter-related ‘levels of 
structuration’ – structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and 
interactional (Waddington, Jones and Critcher 1989:  22) – as a series of concentric 
circles. A ‘flashpoint’, thus, ignites (or not) depending on the specificities of localized 
interaction, but crucially that interaction is mediated through the broader levels. The 
model has been applied to global protest (King and Waddington 2005; Sheptycki 
2005) and highlights how differences in key variables can affect the outcome of 
global protest events. 
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Similarly, P. Waddington (2003: 411) highlights how police approaches vary 
and offers a useful distinction between ‘on the job trouble’ (referring to police 
deployment) and ‘in the job trouble’ (which refers to the fall-out from contentious 
operations). Prospects of the latter may mean that police are inflexible in pursuit of 
certain objectives. The particularities associated with global protest means that the 
dynamic between security, the local community and protestors is heavily biased in 
favour of security. Ericson & Doyle (1999: 605) argue that ‘the policing of protest at 
international events must be understood and researched as a distinctive category’ (cf. 
Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006: 4). They note that such events frequently 
involve government intervention, a preoccupation with security and the mobilisation 
of different legal frameworks and/or security personnel with the consequence that 
local policing priorities may be overruled. 
 
The pre-eminence of structural and political concerns means that there is a 
tendency for policing at international summits to rely upon deployment of ‘heavy and 
repressive police and military control’ (Farnsworth 2004: 64; cf. Waddington and 
King 2005; Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006). Waddington and King (2005) 
view international summits as an exception to the general emphasis on de-escalation. 
Sheptycki (2005: 345-6) argues that ‘when the protest stakes concern fundamental 
tenets of global capitalism, negotiation seems to give way to escalated force’ and that 
policing of anti-globalization protest has seen a reliance upon authoritarian policing 
strategies.  
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The security concerns of global leaders and the compulsions of global 
capitalism, however, are not the sole (if indeed they are the main) determinants of 
police action. Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003: 601) emphasize contextual and 
interactional aspects noting that the diversity of participants and tactics within global 
protests influences whether police resort to coercive means or not. They argue that 
protestors espousing radical goals and employing confrontational tactics are more 
likely to face a repressive response (cf. Noakes and Gilham 2006: 115). Their findings 
rest on media analysis of protest events, meaning that the nuances of police/protestor 
interaction over time are neglected. On the ground, as King and Waddington (2005: 
262-3) observe, negotiated management requires ‘demonstrator groups to have some 
degree of organizational structure, including representatives with the requisite 
authority to enter into negotiation with the police’ (cf. Noakes and Gilham 2006: 108; 
McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998). Without these, where can negotiation 
begin? 
 
Many of the ‘newest social movements’ (Day 2005), however, are premised 
on a critique of models of representation. For Buechler (2000: 207) such movements 
privilege decentralized organizational forms aimed at exposing power-relations and 
undermining the legitimacy of authorities - rather than engaging with them. The 
increased use of force in such circumstances, according to Farnsworth (2004: 64) and 
Noakes and Gilham (2006: 108), is precisely because the logic of direct action 
threatens the established political and economic order. Implicit here is a suggestion 
that there is an emerging approach to policing which perceives global protest events 
as flashpoints to be contained (Reiter and Fillieule 2006: 172; Della Porta, Peterson 
and Reiter 2006: 2). Where this approach conflicts with the policing culture of the 
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host nation, police autonomy is curtailed by overriding security concerns (Ericson and 
Doyle 1999: 605; Peterson 2006).  
 
Noakes, Klocke and Gilham (2005: 251) adopt a more nuanced view, 
describing variations in police strategies along a spectrum incorporating aspects of 
negotiation and incapacitation. King and Waddington (2005: 262) and Wahlström and 
Oskarsson (2006: 140) insist that policing is neither static nor inflexible and that due 
account should be given to ‘lessons learned’. Crucially, P. Waddington argues that 
‘civil libertarian pessimism’ pays insufficient attention to the mediating impact of 
political culture: ‘Civil liberties lie not on a slippery slope, but on contested political 
terrain where victories are secured as well as battles lost’ (Waddington 2005: 354). 
Taking our cue from these accounts, and McPhail et al’s call for detailed research of 
actual practices, we focus here on the contextual specificities of policing in and 
around the G8 summit at Gleneagles. 
 
Our research 
The paper draws on research conducted before, during and immediately after the 
summit. We carried out interviews with three senior and three lower-rank police 
officers (four were formal interviews and two informal). We also interviewed protest 
participants, conducted conversations with dozens of protestors and police officers, 
and undertook a review of media coverage. A survey module in the TNS Scottish 
Omnibus (a monthly poll comprising 1,100 adults across Scotland) provided some 
insight into wider public perceptions. This data was complemented by participant 
observation at key protest sites and events between 2nd and 7th July 2005. This 
combination of methods offers us an insight into the attitudes and plans articulated by 
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police in the run-up to the summit as well as assessing the complex interplay between 
protestors and police during the course of events. Whilst our participant observation 
research covered the week-long protest activities that preceded and accompanied the 
opening of the summit (see Gorringe and Rosie 2006; 2008) this paper focuses on the 
first day of the G8 meeting and the attempts by protestors to take action at the summit 
venue itself. In light of the above, however, it is important to begin with a 
consideration of police attitudes and forms of ‘knowledge’.  
 
Police philosophies 
In many ways Scotland is an ideal location to assess negotiated management since its 
police portray themselves as typifying the ‘softly-softly’ community oriented 
approach. Indeed, preceding the summit the notion of a distinctive ‘Scottish approach 
to policing’ – based on negotiation, consensus and interaction – was prominent in 
media accounts and our interviews. As senior officers in Tayside Police put it: 
‘“Police by consent” is the Scottish way of policing: “Nicey, nicey: let’s not react”’ 
(Ross, Interview). Furthermore Scotland has little recent history of major public 
disorder. This means that Scotland’s police have no officers routinely deployed in 
(and thus hardened to) ‘riot’ situations: 
 
We don’t have specialized riot police … because thankfully we don’t have much 
experience of that in Scotland. But we practice once in a while for those 
occasions when we may need to react more strongly (Vine, Interview). 
 
Our police respondents were confident that they had learnt the lessons of previous 
summits and adapted their approach accordingly. A clear example of such adaptation 
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was the posting of a community liaison officer in Auchterarder (the town next to the 
Gleneagles venue) for a full year preceding the G8. Their intention was to have 
somebody on site to defuse tension, rebut rumours and prepare residents for the event. 
One of the major shortcomings of ‘negotiated management’ as it has been theorised 
has been an overly limiting focus on the protest event. Policing, however  
 
… is a balancing act in which the concerns of locals – who insist that they do 
not want protestors ‘in my High Street’ must be balanced against security 
concerns and the rights of protestors. Locals often seem to want security for 
themselves and not for anyone else, whereas police have to take a wider 
perspective (Ross, Interview). 
 
In a similar vein, the Scottish Executive’s Review of Marches and Parades in 
Scotland (Orr 2005) concluded that a range of local views should be consulted when 
considering whether to permit such events. These accounts emphasise the importance 
of local contingencies for an analysis of policing (cf. Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 
2006: 7). The opinion of locals is a significant influence on police perceptions, and 
clearly needs to be factored in to attempts at negotiated management. Residents need 
to be communicated with just as much as protestors. To this end a dedicated G8 
bulletin was distributed to 6,000 homes in the Auchterarder area to allay fears and 
provide information about road closures, police operations and local services.3 
Additionally, the liaison officer was engaged in ongoing dialogue: ‘I’ve been at 60-
plus meetings with different groups since September at Nursing Homes, Pensioners 
groups, the Boy Scouts – you name it, just going over the ground and trying to 
address people’s concerns (White, Interview).  
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Three-quarters of respondents in our pre-summit opinion poll (74 per cent) 
believed the G8 protests would cause major disruption, two fifths (44 per cent) feared 
they would be violent. Reassuring a worried public, thus, was central to G8 policing.4 
Public concerns were fed by, and fed into, media sensationalism that rendered 
consensus policing difficult. As police and protestor perspectives are primarily 
presented to the public through the news media we face a quadrangular basis for 
negotiation. In this context, as D. Waddington (1992: 160) notes, mass media may 
indirectly produce public disorder ‘by “sensitising” the police and public to the 
possibility that disorder might occur’. Indeed, when Gleneagles was first announced 
as the summit venue, ‘there was an outpouring of you know: Genoa, Evian, Seattle’ 
(White, interview). The association between G8 summits and violence is so 
established (in the media imagination at least) that the mere listing of conference 
venues was sufficient to raise the spectre of disorder.  
 
Police respondents insisted that their jobs were made harder by sensationalist 
coverage (Gorringe and Rosie 2006: 7.1-2). They bemoaned the lack of engagement 
on behalf of news-reporters, and highlighted the problems this posed for community 
policing. Even where police attempted to allay apprehensions through events such as 
a visit to local school-children by mounted officers, the press accentuated the 
negatives: 
 
No they won’t phone me first and allow me to rubbish some of their claims. 
There’s been a steady press build up … it’s been quite intense … when we did 
the press thing you know with the horses and that there were hundreds of 
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cameras and journalists just for that. And obviously that raises people’s 
apprehensions (White, Interview). 
 
A senior officer argued that the ‘influence of the media can undermine months of 
police work’ and noted police attempts to minimize such effects ‘by establishing 
relationships of trust and engaging with people in the media to encourage them to be 
more responsible’ and check reports before filing them (Ross, Interview). To this 
extent, at least, negotiated management must be played out in the media too. Ross 
captured the significance of this in asserting that ‘cops read papers too’ (Ross, 
Interview). Police officers, in other words, share the fears, prejudices and concerns 
inculcated by sensationalized news reports.  
 
Negotiating Police ‘Knowledge’ 
Negotiated management, in other words, is partially dependent on prior perceptions 
and beliefs about protestors. The Orr Report recognised as much in its final 
recommendation, insisting that: 
 
Police forces should ensure that there is appropriate briefing provided for 
officers policing processions and that it includes information about the reasons 
for the procession and the relevant background to the organisation involved. 
(Orr 2005:190) 
 
According to one of our respondents, the internal briefings provided to officers were 
inadequate. Whilst senior officers were well versed in consensual approaches, 
therefore, it may be that this philosophy has yet to fully filter down. Our interviews 
 12
suggest that even some senior officers are yet to be fully persuaded. All our 
interviewees emphasized the need to ‘de-escalate’ situations, and many of their 
examples epitomized the negotiated management approach. Ross, thus, stressed the 
fact that tolerating disruption and being flexible in enforcing the law was crucial 
 
If 2000 people sit down in the middle of the road what are you going to do? 
Can’t arrest them all. Does it matter if the protest march moves at all? Who does 
it harm? Edinburgh will not be moving on those days [of G8 protest], so what 
does a couple of minutes on Princes Street matter? How long are they going to 
stay there? (Ross, Interview). 
 
Negotiating a peaceful conclusion to protests was seen to extend beyond toleration 
into facilitation: 
 
For example, these people want to block the road, we say okay, don’t do this bit, 
go over there and block that one, we allow you to block it for half an hour, we 
even get the press here, … [to] take photographs, but in half an hour you pack 
up and go home. And by and large that works, I don’t mean just for this [the 
G8], it works all over the place. And it works because everybody gets out of it 
what they want. It keeps the emotional charge down, people don’t get excited 
and escalate the confrontation, they’ll get the media exposure for blocking the 
road, we get the benefit of having it time limited, we know where it’s going to 
happen and when it’s going to happen and we can plan around it (Dickinson, 
Interview). 
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The key to such policing is establishing trust - but pre-conceptions may frame how 
police approach specific groups. Negotiation depends on mutual recognition, as 
Wahlström and Oskarsson (2006) note, and some protestors prove more ‘acceptable’ 
than others. This was transparent in Chief Constable Vine’s assertion that some 
protestors had been ‘whisked … up to the gate [at Gleneagles]’. It transpired that 
those so facilitated belonged to Friends of the Earth and the Church of Scotland. 
When such conventional critics are presented as exemplars of protest, we may better 
understand the police responses to anti-systemic groups.  
 
Examining the interplay between police and protestors on the ground reveals 
slippage between policy and implementation and blurred boundaries between 
escalated control and negotiated management. Police respondents clearly 
distinguished between the orderly, stewarded and ‘legitimate’ Make Poverty History 
marchers in Edinburgh and ‘illegitimate’ protestors who were out to cause trouble. In 
line with escalated force terminology (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998: 
52), Ross drew parallels between ‘protest casuals’ and the Inter-City Firm (originally 
denoting violent West Ham United ‘fans’ but  now connoting organized football 
hooliganism more broadly). Similar categorization was uniformly applied to 
‘anarchist’ (or anarchist-tinged) protestors – ‘riot tourists’ (Dickinson, Interview); 
‘criminal tourists’ (Vine, Interview). The prevalent perception that ‘anarchist groups 
… are just there for a ruck’ (Ross, Interview) rendered negotiation and dialogue 
unlikely. Where such perceptions are reinforced by a hierarchy of priorities (in which 
the interests of protestors are relegated to the bottom rung) then consensual policing 
unravels. Our police respondents uniformly emphasized security and the interests of 
local citizens, but recurrent emphasis implicitly cast protestors as a threat and failed to 
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see that accommodation of protest aims might be in the best interests of all parties. 
However, where protestors have no identifiable or willing ‘leadership’ with whom to 
negotiate, then accommodation is impeded and established modes of police/protestor 
interaction cease to be viable (Noakes and Gilham 2006). 
 
Differentiating between protestors is commonly presented as central to 
negotiated policing (Marx 1998; Reicher et al. 2004), but recognizing that some 
groups of protestors are law-abiding and peaceful has the flipside that others may be 
seen and treated as a threat. This may become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Waddington 
and King 2005). Our research highlighted that differentiation applies not only to 
groups of people; it is place-specific too. Well before the summit date Ross insisted 
that Auchterarder was a ‘one horse town’ and that a ‘babies’ pram would gridlock the 
High Street’. ‘Go and look at Gleneagles’, he told us, ‘can you imagine a mass protest 
happening there – there simply isn’t the infrastructure or space’ (Ross, Interview). In 
casting the summit venue as ‘too small’ the ground for curtailing protest was already 
being laid. White reinforced this message: 
 
Now the idea is to hold a rally in the park, but numbers have been limited [by 
the local authority] because there simply isn’t that much room. You should go 
up and see if you can imagine 4,500 people in the park. Now that figure’s there 
to be debated, but the organizers want the impossible, I mean the town simply 
could not cope with the 20,000 people they are talking about! (White, 
Interview). 
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Such views limit attempts at negotiated management by appearing (at least) to restrict 
options in advance. In such circumstances negotiation is hampered if not precluded. 
Colin Fox of the Scottish Socialist Party epitomized the difficulties of negotiating on 
this basis. As part of the coalition organizing the Gleneagles rally Fox should have 
been involved in dialogue. Instead, he believed ‘the police nakedly tried to stop it 
from day one, even on the day’ (Fox, Interview). This emphasizes the significance of 
protestor/police relations to the success of negotiated management and how easily 
trust can evaporate when either side is seen as recalcitrant (cf. Wahlström and 
Oskarsson 2006). 
 
Dialogue clearly has to involve both parties, and attempts to negotiate with 
some protestors ‘was very difficult, [because] there was no allocated sort of 
spokesperson’ (Dickinson, Interview). Officers cited recurrent attempts to contact 
such protestors beforehand, often to no avail: ‘We did everything we possibly could to 
open up the obvious lines of communication. Nobody was interested. Quite the 
opposite; it was a deliberate policy of not telling anybody’ (Dickinson, Interview). 
Policing tactics shaped in interaction with organized protestors falter in the context of 
deliberately ‘dis-organized’ events and tend to revert to command and control 
(Noakes and Gilham 2006; Vitale 2005).  
 
Approaching Auchterarder 
During the Gleneagles protests there were examples of both negotiated management 
and more aggressive policing, offering insights into transnational protest policing. 
Any account of the protests in Auchterarder, however, must begin elsewhere. Stirling 
and Edinburgh were key sites from which protestors departed for Gleneagles.  In 
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Stirling ‘anarchist’ protestors had set up a ‘convergence centre’. Where police have 
not been included in ‘the pre-preparations for an event’, as Fox commented, ‘they go 
for … the hard-faced approach’ (Fox, Interview). Uncertain about the aims and 
objectives of those in the camp, and claiming to have specific ‘intelligence’ of coming 
trouble, police tried to prevent protestors from leaving. Noakes and Gilham (2006: 
111) term this approach to transgressive protest; ‘strategic incapacitation’. Likewise, 
Vine’s account implicitly equated the centre to a prison: 
 
At 6 am there was a break-out from the convergence centre in Stirling. A lot of 
anarchists had left the camp and tried to block the road network. There were 
lock-ons at major road junctions. These people were intent on causing disruption 
(Vine, Interview). 
 
News-reports similarly noted that ‘dozens of officers in riot gear began surrounding 
the site overnight as a “security measure”’. Protestors were searched at the camp 
perimeter and initially only those with tickets to travel away from G8 venues were 
permitted to leave.5 Communication between police and protestors, according to the 
G8 Legal Support Group was minimal: 
 
At the Hori-zone ecovillage in Stirling for long periods of time the police 
refused to let anyone leave. Legal Observers from the G8 Legal Support Group 
were also detained, preventing us from monitoring some of the protests. No 
legal justification was provided for this abuse of power.6 
 
 17
There were accounts of people being detained without access to toilets, food or water 
for four hours (Indymedia7), but also of friendly police engaging in negotiations to 
end road-blocks or liaise with coaches travelling to the summit (Indymedia8). Similar 
contrasts characterized the events in Edinburgh and Auchterarder that we ourselves 
observed and highlight the importance of discretion and interaction. On the morning 
of 6 July, according to radio news reports, Edinburgh was ‘gridlocked’ after protestors 
blocked roads across the city. A mixture of negotiated and forceful policing, however, 
minimized disruption in most instances. Within 10 minutes of one report, for instance, 
the ‘blockade’ in the West End of the city had dispersed. A line of police lingered 
around hotels where some Summit delegates were staying, although protestors had 
been moved on. There was one arrest, but a sense that ‘[protestors] had got what they 
wanted with the media coverage’ (Gorringe, fieldnotes).  
 
The main event in Edinburgh that day occurred as coach-loads of protestors 
prepared to depart for Gleneagles. The atmosphere was good humoured even when 
police announced that the march had been cancelled. Tayside’s Chief Constable later 
told us: 
 
It was cancelled. Look, let me take you through some of what was happening on 
that day. At 6am there was a break-out from the convergence centre in Stirling. 
A lot of anarchists had left the camp and … were intent on causing disruption. 
So at 12pm, the march was cancelled. It couldn’t go ahead because the road 
network was disrupted and there were Black Bloc anarchists on the flyovers 
either side of Auchterarder. We thought that we didn’t have the resources to 
safely manage the march. But there were 1,500 people already here at that time 
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and we were in discussions with G8 Alternatives negotiators … We were 
committed to getting as many people to Auchterarder as possible. So it 
eventually happened, but at 2.30 pm – two hours later than scheduled (Vine, 
Interview).  
 
The contradictions, confusions, and ambiguities which typified policing on the day 
are captured here. The terms of ‘negotiated management’, it is clear, are set by the 
police. Whilst the latter half of the quote insists that facilitation and negotiation were 
paramount, the announcement that the march was ‘cancelled’ belied this. Colin Fox, 
who was also on one of the buses, provided an alternative reading of the situation:  
 
11 O’clock news on all the radio stations announced it was off, it had been 
cancelled ... I think it was a very important day because it was the defiance of 
those that tried to take away our peaceful, democratic and legal rights. The 
demonstration itself suffered enormously from the Police’s signalled - or quite 
frankly physical - attempts to stop it from happening. And I think you know it 
was perhaps through good fortune rather than anything else that there was not 
more frustration and trouble there (Fox, Interview). 
 
Vine insisted that police ‘had to balance the safety and concerns of residents, 
marchers and police officers’ (Interview), but the breakdown of communication was 
the antithesis of ‘negotiated management’. Negotiated solutions require both sides to 
act in good faith and fulfil promises (Wahlström and Oskarsson 2006: 125). Given the 
protracted process by which permission for the march was obtained (Fox, Interview), 
its sudden ‘cancellation’ was interpreted (rightly or wrongly) as a breach of trust. The 
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pitfalls of such ‘mismanagement’ were nowhere more evident than in Edinburgh. 
Whilst some coaches were allowed to depart others were stopped and in the confusion 
some protestors staged a rally there and then: 
 
Protesters began marching down Princes Street after being unable to get on 
buses to travel to the G8 Alternatives protest at Gleneagles. Their demonstration 
eventually lasted more than five hours and caused disruption to numerous streets 
around the centre of Edinburgh. (Esson 2005) 
 
The halting of buses constituted a ‘flashpoint’ (Waddington, Jones and Critcher 
1989). The significance of such moments, as King and Waddington (2005: 259) 
argue, ‘is that they are invariably interpreted symbolically as indicating a refusal by 
one or both sides to accommodate the perceived “rights”, interests and objectives of 
their opponents’. In seeking to reduce operational difficulties – P. Waddington’s 
(2003) ‘on the job trouble’ – around the summit venue, the police inadvertently 
opened up a new protest front: The protestors were marching in Edinburgh ‘because 
they had not been allowed to go to Gleneagles’ (Gorringe, fieldnotes). Faced by an 
unplanned and unexpected protest, police announced that the Gleneagles march was, 
after all, going ahead. One demonstrator with a loud-hailer tried to encourage people 
to return to the buses, but others decided that staying put and protesting was 
preferable to a long bus journey to an uncertain demonstration (Gorringe, fieldnotes). 
 
Faced by the prospect of more protests in Edinburgh, only days after scenes 
described as ‘the battle of Princes Street’9, police actions encompassed both toleration 
and repression. Early on, perhaps hoping to nip the protests in the bud, three self-
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identified ‘organisers’ who tried to negotiate with the police were arrested (Gorringe, 
fieldnotes; cf. Esson 2005)10. The police’s message seemed clear: ‘we are not 
prepared to negotiate’. Thereafter, though, police tactics became less interventionist 
and concentrated on monitoring the protestors as they embarked on an uncharted 
march around the city. As this progressed the numbers of both protestors and police 
dwindled, through inclement weather, fatigue, and the lack of a clear objective: 
 
At 3.45 pm a ragged bunch of protestors straggled up Middle Meadow Walk 
headed towards Princes Street. Weary police officers in everyday uniforms 
traipsed after them. There were more marchers than police officers and the 
intent seemed to be to keep an eye on them and let the protest fizzle out of its 
own accord (Gorringe, fieldnotes). 
 
Meanwhile those buses allowed to leave proceeded at a snail’s pace. Given that trains 
to Gleneagles were cancelled, there were few other means of reaching the summit 
venue. There were reports of buses being stopped and searched and at times the 
coaches were going so slowly that passengers could get out and stretch their legs (or 
empty their bladders) before climbing back on board (Rosie, fieldnotes). Protestors 
were forced to find circuitous routes to Auchterarder due to a combination of 
protestors and police blocking roads, and it was unclear whether a march would 
happen. It was after midday before it was confirmed that the march could go ahead. 
Finally, at 2 pm, those who had managed to assemble at the park in Auchterarder set 
off on a pre-arranged route towards the Gleneagles Hotel.   
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Policing in Auchterarder tended to be low-key and helpful and some local 
residents cheered and waved as marchers filed past (Rosie, fieldnotes). As the 5,000 
strong march neared the fence, however, the parameters of protest became clear. 
When protestors tried to breach the fence, or sit-down alongside it, policing became 
more interventionist. In a dramatic ‘show-of-force’ replete with symbolism, groups of 
police reinforcements were flown in low over the crowd in Chinook helicopters. 
Regardless of actual intention, this signalled an end to soft-hat policing and police 
determination to ‘die-in-a-ditch’ to protect the venue if required (cf. Peterson 2006: 
68). Skirmishes in fields around the summit, whilst producing dramatic pictures, were 
limited and the prevailing sense – from our perspective on the G8 Alternatives11 
demonstration at least – was of reasonably relaxed police/protestor exchanges aided in 
large part by adherence to prior agreements (Rosie, fieldnotes). ‘The fact that there 
were no significant injuries’, as Vine noted, ‘bears testimony to a successful 
operation’ (Vine, Interview).  
 
Had we gained access to key figures within less mainstream protests, however, 
it is questionable whether this analysis could have been sustained. Our interviews 
pointed to the differential treatment meted out to, and perceptions of, differing protest 
groups. Where Christians were ushered to the gates, G8 Alternatives were allowed, 
reluctantly, to march and ‘anarchists’ were subject to more ‘robust’ policing:  
 
There were 97 arrests and G8 Alternatives denied responsibility for most of 
them. Those arrested were mainly from Belgium, Holland, Germany, Spain – 
anarchist groups. The G8 Alternatives - who are left or far left I suppose … 
were facilitated in legitimate protest (Vine, interview). 
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Discussion 
The Gleneagles protests offer insights into protest policing. Della Porta and Reiter 
(1998) suggest that protest policing in Western democracies has become increasingly 
democratic and consensual, but summit protests are seen as an exception to this rule 
(Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006). We suggest the picture is more complicated. 
All our police respondents subscribed to negotiated management and repeatedly 
emphasized the need for ‘de-escalation’. Protest was tolerated and, on occasion, 
facilitated during the G8 summit in the conviction that ‘draconian policing is bad for 
mainstream politics’ (Vine, Interview). Throughout the protests, however, there were 
indications that ‘negotiated management’ had strict parameters. Most interviews 
implicitly differentiated between legitimate and illegitimate protestors, suggesting that 
some groups were simply ‘there for a ruck’ and could not be negotiated with. Echoing 
Peterson (2006: 73), we find the potential flattening of democratic debate – entailed in 
the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protestors – deeply troubling.     
 
Negotiated management can only work when both sides recognize the other. 
Police (and, indeed, protestor) preparations for violence, thus, may become self-
fulfilling prophecies and undermine attempts at dialogue (cf. Peterson 2006: 54). 
Negotiation from inflexible positions fails – when police arrested the self-appointed 
negotiators on Princes Street on Wednesday it hardened resolve amongst protestors to 
disregard police instructions. In this context we reiterate a key recommendation of 
Jefferson’s (1990: 144) study on the need for flexible and experimental approaches to 
policing, especially better means of communication during protest events. We also 
echo the Orr Report’s (2005) recommendation on the need to thoroughly brief officers 
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about protest constituencies beforehand to breakdown misapprehensions. A major 
shortcoming of ‘negotiated management’ as it has been theorised in the literature has 
been an unnecessarily limited focus on protest events themselves – neglecting the 
insights of the flashpoints model and the need for wider contextualisation (McPhail, 
Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998). 
 
One crucial aspect of this wider context is the pre-history of police-protestor 
relations and the knowledge held by each of the other (cf. Wahlström and Oskarsson 
2006). The association between global protest and violence, or forceful policing, thus, 
was subject to question in Scotland. Although there were indications that some police 
tactics were ‘imported’, local policing culture and history had a bearing on the 
experience of events: ‘What is reacted to violently in one setting, with particular 
structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual and situational features, may 
evoke a less dramatic response in another’ (Waddington, Jones and Critcher 1989: 
166). The ‘flashpoints model’ offers a corrective to accounts suggesting global (at 
least Western) convergence in policing tactics, although, as King and Waddington 
(2005) note, the model is not flawless. 
 
These authors highlight various factors that explain why some events ‘ignite’ 
whilst others do not. Over-emphasizing the potential for disorder focuses attention 
away from repertoires of contention and engagement that shape and constrain protest 
actions (Tilly 1986). The focus, furthermore, is on protestors and ‘triggers’. In the 
case of the Gleneagles march, however, the consequences of some police decisions - 
containing people in Stirling’s convergence centre, stopping coaches in Edinburgh - 
show that tense stand-offs may not be the result of a ‘flashpoint’ so much as a police 
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tactic (cf. Noakes and Gilham 2006). Additionally, following P. Waddington (1994) it 
is clear that police discretion means that there may not be one single event. Numerous 
encounters during the day could have become ‘flashpoints’ had either the police or the 
protestors reacted differently. 
  
This suggests that the flashpoint model lacks sufficient nuance for the analysis 
of global protests. As with other such events, Scotland’s protests were characterized 
by different groups (police, protestors, media, public), locations and styles of both 
protest and policing. Each group, furthermore, was internally differentiated and what 
constituted a ‘flashpoint’ for one faction was not necessarily seen in the same way by 
others. The rise in ‘tolerant identities’ and ‘diversity of tactics’ (Della Porta 2005) 
adds complexity to protestor-police encounters. Furthermore viewing ‘levels of 
structuration’ as concentric circles within which an event takes shape (Waddington, 
Jones and Critcher 1989: 22) privileges the point of interaction. In global summits, as 
we have seen, concerns over ‘in the job trouble’ can dictate policing and influence the 
form that any interaction takes. 
 
At the very least the flashpoints model needs to be updated to better account 
for contemporary protest. This is clear from Waddington, Jones and Critcher’s (1989: 
167) assertion that the ‘possibility of arbitration’ (emphasis in original) cannot be 
ruled out. The rationale of anti-capitalist protest, however, is precisely to undermine 
state legitimacy by flouting laws and rejecting the authority of the police (cf. Noakes 
and Gilham 2006). Arbitration is hampered in such a context and it is puzzling that 
the Orr Report (2005) contains no consideration whatsoever of non-formal or non-
organised protests. ‘Best practice’, according to the report, requires 28 days notice of 
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a procession to enable divergent views to be taken into account, emphasising the 
‘permit culture’ on which negotiated management is premised (McPhail, 
Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998). 
 
Ignoring this blind-spot with regard to non-organized protest, it seems clear 
that ‘best practice’ must work both ways: police need to cooperate and be more open 
too. ‘Negotiated management’ proves a misnomer when asymmetries of power 
preclude meaningful interaction, or when ‘negotiated’ solutions are underpinned by 
the threat of escalated force. King and Waddington’s (2006: 95) phrase ‘superficially 
soft-hat policing’ captures these limitations. The on/off Auchterarder march and 
mixed messages emanating from police sources compounded problems. 
Mismanagement and/or misinformation encouraged impromptu demonstrations in 
Edinburgh and eroded trust.  
 
Given this it is concerning (though unsurprising) that Scotland’s police view 
their handling of the G8 as an unbridled success. Tayside Police’s (2006:17-18) 
annual report, for example, focused on ‘worldwide praise’ for the force. The Lothian 
and Borders Police website was, likewise, self-laudatory, reproducing appreciative e-
mails from the public12. LBP’s performance report 2005/2006 acknowledged that the 
G8 protests had been a ‘severe test’ (Lothian and Borders Police 2006: 7), but argued 
that this highlighted ‘that the police service is of central importance in helping people 
to exercise their democratic right to protest and be heard’ (2006: 1). The Scottish 
public seem to agree. In our July opinion poll, two-thirds (67 per cent) felt that police 
handling of the protests was ‘about right’, with relatively few feeling it was ‘not harsh 
enough’ (18 per cent), and even fewer ‘too harsh’ (8 per cent)13.  
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Whilst policing at Gleneagles was far less militarized than that seen at recent 
summits (including Heiligendamm 2007), uncritical celebration of the people’s police 
obscures subtle challenges to democratic accountability. The danger is that ‘genuine’ 
protest is reduced to the safe, consensual and permitted modes of expression 
epitomised by Make Poverty History (Gorringe and Rosie 2006). Whilst such 
demonstrations appeal to a wider array of participants, the marginalization and 
criminalization of anti-systemic or non-institutionalized protest constitutes a shrinking 
of the public sphere (Peterson 2006: 72), and indicates the deleterious impact of 
global power relations on democracy (cf. Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006: 4).   
 
Conclusion 
For all the efforts of the police, the key to the relatively low levels of disruption in 
Scotland arguably lies in the choice of venue. Given that ‘in the job’ concerns will 
always trump the interests of protestors when it comes to protecting foreign 
dignitaries – as reflected in a recurrent stress on security – ‘on the job’ difficulties are 
perhaps best alleviated by removing the focus of contention. As King and 
Waddington (2005) found in Canada and we found in Scotland (Gorringe and Rosie 
2006), protests removed from the summit venue were less subject to overbearing 
security concerns. As one respondent (who wished their comment to be anonymized) 
put it: 
 
If the eight leaders desperately want to get together every year, and it really is 
important - then, to my mind, let’s just buy a Pacific island, fortify it, surround it 
 27
with navies of all 8 countries and let them go there all the time. I’m not sure the 
investment justifies the cost (Interview). 
 
If transnational policing offers insights into the ‘global system’ (Sheptycki 2005), the 
limitation of protest to ‘respectable’ actors suggests a curtailing of alternatives. 
Underpinning the shift towards a more negotiated style of policing was the genuine 
desire for accountable and democratic policing. Isolating world leaders on an island 
might free police resources from an over-riding constraint (to protect the summit), but 
it would strip the veneer of legitimacy from unaccountable gatherings of world 
leaders. Protestors, thus, play a vital role in testing the limits of ‘negotiation’, 
rendering power visible and raising searching questions about the spaces available for 
democratic debate and contestation. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
1 We are indebted to the University of Edinburgh Development Trust Fund for facilitating our research. 
We are grateful to Tayside Police, Lothian and Borders Police, TNS Social, Colin Fox and to the many 
volunteers who helped us. We have also benefited greatly from the insightful and constructive 
comments of the editor and the anonymous reviewers. 
2 A list of cited interviews, and the status of the respondent, can be found at the end of this article. 
3 To view ‘Updates’: http://www.taysidepolice.gov.uk/g8/local_newsletter.php (Accessed 05/10/07). 
4 TNS Scottish Omnibus, June 2005.  See Gorringe and Rosie (2006). 
5 See report at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4658351.stm (Accessed: 05/10/07). 
6 http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2005/07/318170.html (Accessed: 05/10/07).  
7 http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2005/07/318170.html (Accessed: 05/10/07).  
8 See report at: http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2005/07/316516.html (Accessed: 05/10/07). 
9 The Scotsman (05/07/05), for example, led with the headline: ‘Batons drawn in the Battle of Princes 
Street: http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=738592005 (Accessed 05/10/07). 
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10 This report was confirmed by those who were on the rally and during the interview with Colin Fox. 
11 G8 Alternatives was a coalition of political parties and extra-institutional groups committed to 
protesting against, and articulating alternatives to, the Gleneagles summit. See Hubbard and Miller 
(2005) for a detailed account of their constituents, demands and ideals. 
12 http://www.lbp.police.uk/G8/positive_stories/index.asp (Link broken October 2007, but see: 
http://www.lbp.police.uk/G8/ (Accessed 05/10/2007). 
13 TNS Scottish Omnibus, July 2005 
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